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Air-raids and the crowd: citizens at war 
 
Edgar Jones explores how British people responded to air raids during the Second 
World War and what this might tell us about the capacity of ordinary people to cope 
under extreme stress. 
 
 
The declaration of war in September 1939 exposed civilians in Britain not only to the 
prospect of an invasion but also to the threat of chemical weapons. Planners 
believed that Germany would conduct an intense aerial campaign, dropping not only 
incendiaries but also bombs filled with poison gas. In autumn 1938, 38 million gas 
masks were issued and Air Raid Precautions (ARP), a civil defence organisation set up 
in 1924, trained people in their use; decontamination centres were set up and the 
emergency services taught first-aid for toxic exposure. In the event, German raids 
focused on London and for eight months, from 7 September 1940 to 10 May 1941, 
the capital was bombed on a nightly basis. Then, having failed to invade the UK, 
Hitler turned his attention to the Soviets and period of relative calm followed. Yet, in 
summer 1944, just when people thought that the war was as good as won, the V1 
and V2 rockets brought death and destruction back to London and the south east. 
This article explores the impact of air-raids on civilian morale and whether are there 
any lessons to be learned about peoples’ capacity to cope in light of the current 
terrorist threat.  
 
Predictions of panic 
In the build-up to war, military planners and health-care professionals judged that 
the British people lacked the coping skills to resist a determined bombing campaign. 
In a best-selling study, Wilfred Trotter, professor of surgery at University College 
Hospital, argued that the protective instinct of ‘gregariousness’, which drew people 
together in time of crisis, would not be effective in wartime. Without the formal 
bonding and discipline found in hierarchical groups, such as the armed forces, he 
predicted that civilians exposed to danger would collapse into an ‘undisciplined civil 
mob’ with a propensity to ‘panic’ (Trotter, 1919, pp. 150-51).  Trotter drew on the 
ideas of the French anthropologist, Gustave Le Bon, who had argued that individuals 
absorbed into an heterogeneous crowd became impulsive and irritable, losing the 
capacity to exercise judgment (Le Bon, 1897, p. 35). Whilst the First World War had 
demonstrated that most civilians, if organized into homogeneous military groups, 
could cope with the intense stress of the battlefield, serious doubts remained about 
those who had not been trained and subjected to army discipline.  
 
 Furthermore, observations of how Londoners behaved when subjected to air-
raids during the First World War appeared to confirm Trotter’s belief in the inherent 
weakness of heterogeneous groups. In the context of a high-casualty war, Zeppelin 
airships and Gotha bombers killed relatively few UK civilians (1,239 in total). Yet, 
between 100,000 to 300,000 Londoners took shelter in Underground stations, whilst 
a further 500,000 were thought to have sought refuge in basements and cellars. This 
behaviour was interpreted by the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) as evidence 
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of lack of resolve. The CID, which in 1937 estimated that a 60-day aerial 
bombardment would kill 600,000 and wound 1.2 million, believed that the 
psychological effects would be ‘out of all proportion greater’ than the physical 
effects, fearing ‘a disorderly general flight’ from the capital (Titmuss, 1950, p. 18). As 
a result, the primary aim of ARP services was ‘the maintenance of the morale of the 
people’. Plans were laid for some 17,000 regular troops and 20,000 reserve 
constables to be drafted into London to control the expected mass exodus from the 
capital and to prevent panic at main-line stations (Titmuss, 1950, pp. 13-19). Despite 
these pessimistic forecasts, Trotter had offered a crumb of hope: homogeneity could 
be fostered finding roles for civilians and by reducing inequality created by ‘the 
social system of class segregation’ (Trotter, 1919, pp. 155-56). 
 
Controversy 
The pessimistic forecast of the CID proved wildly inaccurate as a total of 146,777 
civilians were killed or seriously injured in the UK during the Second World War. Of 
these, 80, 397 (54.8%) were in London region (O’Brien, 1955). Historians are divided 
about the impact of this mortality on morale. Not surprisingly the official historians, 
O’Brien and Titmuss, argued there was no panic and that the health of the nation 
actually improved during wartime. Dissenters from this position include Angus 
Calder who argued that Britain in 1940 provided ‘ample evidence, familiar and 
unfamiliar, to indicate widespread fear and paranoia bordering on panic’ (Calder, 
1991, p. 109). Clive Ponting maintained that the ‘Blitz spirit’ owed more to 
government propaganda and a censored media than to reality (Ponting, 1990).  
 
 What evidence, then, survives from the period to inform us about about the 
people’s morale? At first, the government relied on anecdotal reports from officials 
and surveys commissioned from Mass-Observation. However by autumn 1941 the 
Ministry of Home Security had directed its Research and Experiments Department to 
investigate the impact of air raids on morale and productive output onwards, using a 
range of measures from absenteeism and sickness from work, destruction of houses, 
content analysis of newspaper reports and population surveys. It is from these 
investigations that our understanding of the conflict is best understood.  
 
Chemical Weapons 
Because of the real threat of chemical weapons, the government commissioned 
regular surveys of the percentage of the population carrying their respirator as an 
indicator of readiness. On the outbreak of war, it was estimated that 75% of the 
population took their gas mask with them but the absence of air-raids saw the 
proportion fall to 5% by spring 1940. Defeat in France and the Dunkirk evacuation 
witnessed a temporary rise to 30% but by the time the Blitz hit London the Home 
Office reported, ‘there is no evidence that a large proportion of people anywhere 
now carry their gas masks’ (Anon, 1940, p. 2). Intelligence officers at the Home 
Office interpreted a low level of mask carrying in Liverpool in January 1941 as an 
indicator of high morale and civilian confidence. However the final phase of the Blitz, 
when U-boats were sinking record tonnages of Allied shipping and German forces 
advanced through the Balkans, saw the carrying of masks in London again become a 
common sight (Calder, 1969). 
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Evidence from the First World War suggested that soldiers who had been 
trained in anti-gas measures and habituated to the threat in the front-line coped 
well during gas attacks. Civilians in the Second World War were never tested but 
evidence from Japan (where in March 1995 the Aum Shrinriko cult released sarin 
into the Tokyo subway) and Israel during the first Gulf War (where some 
misinterpreted the conventional detonations of Scud missiles as chemical weapons) 
suggests that bombs filled with mustard gas or anthrax would have eroded morale. 
The preparedness of the UK population and the fact that Britain was ready to take 
retaliatory action were likely reasons why Hitler never employed this strategy, 
together with practical difficulties of delivering a significant quantity of toxin over a 
large city.  
 
Psychosomatic illness 
In April 1941, Tom Harrisson, one of the founders of Mass-Observation, created a 
controversy by writing to the BMJ to suggest that doctors had missed an epidemic of 
hidden illness caused by the psychological effects of air-raids (Harrisson, 1941). 
Traumatised civilians, he argued, simply went to bed and stayed there as stigma 
deterred them from going to see their family doctor. Although number of 
psychiatrists refuted his claim, anecdotal evidence suggested a significant increase in 
psychosomatic disorders. Felix Brown, a psychiatric registrar at Guy’s, observed an 
increase in cases characterised by medically unexplained symptoms in patients with 
no history of mental illness (Brown, 1941, p. 687).  In August 1940, after a series of 
raids on Bristol, D. Molesworth, an official in the intelligence branch of the Ministry 
of Home Security, interviewed a panel doctor based in Filton, a northern suburb of 
the port, who reported an increased incidence of indigestion cases, and estimated at 
least 15% absenteeism from work after severe bombing (Molesworth, 1940: 2). 
Edward Glover, a London psychoanalyst, argued that civilians suffering from the 
trauma of air raids tended to express their distress as bodily sensations and were 
either treated as cases of apparent organic illness or suffered without referral 
(Glover, 1942).  
 
Casualty rates 
To convince the US Government that Britain had not succumbed to an epidemic of 
psychological illness, Aubrey Lewis was asked to provide a report on ‘the incidence 
of neurosis’ (Lewis, 1942). He found no significant increase in psychiatric morbidity 
and concluded that most of those who broke down after air-raids had a history of 
vulnerability to stress. If the surveys conducted by various government departments 
were accurate and there was no evidence of a collapse in morale or a significant rise 
in psychological casualties, how can we explain the impact of the 60,595 civilian 
deaths? The crude explanation is that the mortality rate remained relatively low 
given the size of the urban population and the length of the conflict. In London, for 
example, the 29,890 deaths represented 0.3% of the capital’s population. The 
highest rates were in Plymouth and Coventry where in both towns 0.5% of residents 
were killed (Anon, 1948). From 1941 onwards, increasing resources were deployed 
to research designed to measure how much destruction needed to be wrought on 
Germany cities to bring about a collapse in morale and manufacturing capacity 
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(Overy, 2014). Without the capacity of Bomber Command and the US Eighth Air 
Force, Hitler attacked UK civilians directly with rockets and an indirectly through a U-
boat campaign designed to severe food supplies.  
 
However during the conflict itself, a number of psychiatrists argued that the 
health effects of the conflict might not be revealed until the return of peace. Aubrey 
Lewis warned that the full effect of ‘war-related stress’ might be delayed and that 
‘the evil harvest may be reaped afterwards’ (Lewis, 1943, p. 27). Equally, a national 
survey conducted in 1943 by Dr C.P. Blacker found that many directors of psychiatric 
clinics believed that ‘latent neurosis’ existed in the civilian population. Whether this 
developed into overt psychological or psycho-somatic disorder after the war was 
dependent on ‘the social and economic conditions… and the moral atmosphere 
which prevailed’ (Blacker, 1946, p. 175). In essence, Blacker believed that the 
availability of employment and attitudes towards work would determine the volume 
of war pension claims for traumatic illnesses.  
 
Anniversary of 7/7 
Media reports of the tenth anniversary of the 7 July bombings have focused on 
resilience and compassion exhibited by both civilians and members of the 
emergency services. No examples of panic or dysfunctional fear have been reported. 
In this sense the narrative of the Blitz and the terror attack are similar in content. 
The events are, however, on a different scale and it would be unwise to infer from 
civilians engaged in a national war of survival when the dominate culture was ‘stiff-
upper-lip’ that people uniformly have a high threshold to trauma. 
 
[Text 1,900] 
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